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Abstract 
When productivity is fostered by an individual’s own human capital as well as by the 
economy-wide average level of human capital, individuals under-invest in human capital. 
The provision of subsidies for the formation of human capital, conditional on the subsidy 
being self-financed by tax revenues, can bring the economy to its socially optimal level of 
human capital. Yet a strictly positive probability of migration to a richer country, by raising 
both the level of human capital formed by optimizing individuals in the home country and the 
average level of human capital of non-migrants in the country, can enhance welfare and 
nudge the economy toward the social optimum. Indeed, under a well-controlled, restrictive 
migration policy the welfare of all workers is higher than in the absence of this policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a strong consensus that deficiency in human capital is a major reason why poor countries 
remain poor. Much – though not all – of the human capital in a country is a result of decisions made 
by individuals. But individual choices seldom add up to the social optimum. In particular, 
individuals do not consider the positive externalities that human capital confers in production. The 
result is that they acquire less human capital than is desirable. If individuals could be persuaded to 
form more human capital, the human capital that is acquired in an economy could rise to the 
socially optimal level of human capital. What makes an unfortunate state of affairs worse is that 
whatever quantities of human capital are formed, some – and often more than a mere some – are 
lost through the migration leakage. It comes as little surprise then that the concern heretofore has 
been to contain this leakage. In the words of a recent World Development Report: “Can something 
be done to stop the exodus of trained workers from poorer countries?” (World Bank, 1995, p.64). 
This concern follows, and is in congruence with, the large “brain drain” literature (for a systematic 
review see Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989). 
 
In this paper we turn this concern on its head. We argue that the prospect of migration can 
well be harnessed to induce individuals to form a socially desirable level of human capital. Our key 
idea is that compared to a closed economy, an economy open to migration differs not only in the 
opportunities that workers face but also in the structure of the incentives they confront; higher 
prospective returns to human capital in a foreign country impinge on human capital formation 
decisions at home. We use a simple model in which an individual’s productivity is fostered by his 
own human capital as well as by the economy-wide average level of human capital. We examine 
the relationship between the actual formation of human capital in an economy, the optimal 
formation of human capital in the economy, and the public provision of subsidies for the formation 
of human capital in the economy in the absence of migration. We calculate the (positive) level of 
subsidy required to ensure that the human capital formed is equal to the socially optimal human 
capital. We next examine the relationship between the actual formation of human capital in the 
economy and the optimal formation of human capital in the presence of a possibility of migration. 
We state conditions under which per capita output and the level of welfare of all workers are higher 
with migration than in its absence. We show that a controlled and restrictive migration policy can 
be an effective instrument to enhance welfare and nudge the economy toward the social optimum. 
We derive this result first when all workers are alike and are equally capable of responding to the 
migration prospect, and second when workers differ both in their skills and in their ability to 
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respond. We conclude that migration is conducive to the formation of human capital, and that the 
presence of migration can substitute for the provision of public subsidies as a means of bringing 
about the formation of a socially preferred level of human capital. Thus, we cast migration as a 
harbinger of human capital gain, not as the culprit of human capital drain. An additional interesting 
implication of our perception of what migration can entail is that the gains from migration to the 
home country accrue neither from migrants’ remittances nor from migrants’ return home with 
amplified skills acquired abroad. 
 
2. Human Capital Formation in an Economy without Migration 
 
Consider a closed economy or a small open economy without migration. The economy produces a 
single commodity, the price of which is normalized at 1. There are N identical workers in the 
economy. The single production input is labor. The worker’s twice-differentiable cost function of 
forming human capital is ( ) qq kc = , where q  is the worker’s human capital (the sum total of his 
efficiency units of labor), and 0>k  is a constant1. The economy-wide level of output is 
( )qNfQ = , where ( ) ( ) ( )1ln1ln +++= qhqaqf  is the concave, per-worker production function, 
k>a  is a constant, q  is the economy-wide average level of human capital, and 0>h  represents 
the externalities accruing from the average level of human capital. (Externalities in production arise 
when as a result of individuals acquiring human capital, they not only make themselves more 
productive but also make each other more productive. Conversely, when individuals fail to form 
human capital, they not only make themselves less productive but also make each other less 
productive. A simple way of conditioning a worker’s output not only on his own human capital but 
also on the human capital of others is to have the worker’s output depend on the average level of 
human capital.) Workers supply their human capital inelastically, having acquired it instantly, 
though not costlessly, at the beginning of their single-period life. Workers borrow the requisite 
funds to support the human capital formation at a zero rate of interest.  
 
 Since labor is the only production input, the gross earnings per worker are simply equal to 
the output per worker, that is, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1ln1ln +++= qhqaqf  for 0>q .  (1) 
                                                 
1 A linear cost function is chosen because it simplifies the analysis. For a usage of a convex cost function see Stark, 
  Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1998). 
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The coefficients a and h can be interpreted, respectively, as measures of the private returns and the 
social returns of human capital. The worker seeks to maximize his net earnings, that is, his output 
minus the cost of forming human capital. The net earnings per worker function associated with 
human capital q  is thus  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) qqhqaq kW -+++= 1ln1ln  for 0>q .  (2) 
The worker’s decision problem is how much human capital to form. In this setting, since 
( )
k
W
-
+
=
¶
¶
1q
a
q
q
, the worker’s chosen level of human capital 2 is  
 01* >-=
k
a
q .   (3) 
Since there are N identical workers in the economy, the average level of human capital in the 
economy is also *q . Therefore, net earnings per worker are 
 ( ) k
k
W +-+= a
a
haq ln)( * .   (4) 
The following lemma will be helpful in subsequent analysis.  
 
Lemma: For any 1>x , 1ln -> xxx . 3 
 
 By substituting 
k
x
a
=  and applying the Lemma, it can be easily seen that 0)( * >qW . 
However, since the social returns of human capital are not internalized by the individual worker, *q  
is not the socially optimal level of human capital. Net earnings per worker are maximized when the 
externalities from the economy-wide average level of human capital are taken into account. To do 
so, we consider the function  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) qqhqaq kW -+++= 1ln1ln  for 0>q .  (5) 
The social planner’s problem is to maximize the social welfare function (5) by choosing q . Since 
( )
k
W
-
+
+
=
¶
¶
1q
ha
q
q
, the socially optimal level of human capital is 
 1** -
+
=
k
ha
q .  (6) 
                                                 
2  From the concavity of the )(qf  function it follows that the second-order condition for a maximum, 
( )
( )
0
212
2
<
+
-=
¶
¶
q
a
q
qW
, holds. 
3  The proof is in Appendix I. 
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Clearly, since 0>h , *** qq > . If workers choose to form this socially optimal level of human 
capital, net earnings per worker will become 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) k
k
W ++-
+
+= ha
ha
haq ln** .  (7)  
 Since  
     [ ])1(lnln)()()( *** --=-++=- xxxWW ah
a
ha
haqq ,  
where 1>
+
=
a
ha
x ,  it follows from the Lemma that )()( *** qq WW > .4 Net earnings per worker 
attained under the social planner’s choice of q are higher than those achieved when workers choose 
how much human capital to form without taking into consideration the human capital externality. 
By construction, )( **qW  represents the highest net earnings per worker achievable, given the 
production technology. Unfortunately, when choosing how much human capital to form, an 
individual worker will not pay heed to the economy-wide average level of human capital, except as 
a parameter. In a large economy no individual can affect the economy’s average level of human 
capital. Thus, the prevailing level of human capital will be *q . 
 
3. Human Capital Formation in an Economy without Migration: The Corrective Role 
of Public Subsidies 
 
In this section we cast public subsidies as a means to correct the inefficiencies that arise from the 
human capital externalities. We show that a combination of subsidy and tax can achieve the social 
optimum. 
 
Suppose that the cost of forming a unit of human capital is reduced by s to k-s, and that a 
proportional income tax at the rate of t is imposed to finance the subsidy (the subsidy bill is self-
financed by the tax revenues). The welfare of an individual is then measured by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ,1ln1ln1~ qqhqaq sktW --+++-=  (8) 
and the budget constraint of the government is 
 ( ) ( )[ ] .1ln1ln qqhqa st =+++  (9) 
                                                 
4  That )*()**( qq WW >  also follows from the concavity of the )(qf  function since when *** qq > , 
)*()**( qq WW > . 
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Maximizing ( )qW~ , taking q , t, and s as given, the individual will choose ( ) .11~* -
-
-
=
sk
t aq  
Whether or not the social optimum can be obtained under such a subsidy-tax scheme depends on 
whether there exist t and s such that ***
~
qq =  (where, to recall, 1** -
+
=
k
ha
q  is the socially 
optimal level of human capital) and the government budget constraint is satisfied. Put differently, 
we are looking for t and s such that 
 
( )
ksk
t haa +
=
-
-1
 (10) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) úû
ù
êë
é -
-
-
=
-
-
+ 1
11
ln
sk
t
s
sk
t
t
aa
ha . (11) 
This is a system of two equations and two unknowns, so a solution exists (see Appendix II). The 
subsidy s and the proportional tax t that emerge as a solution of this system set the welfare of the 
individual, ( )*~~ qW  as defined in (8), equal to )( **qW  in (7). 
 
4. Human Capital Formation in an Economy with Migration 
 
In this section we cast migration policy as a tool to mitigate the inefficiency arising from human 
capital externalities. Assume that an opportunity to migrate to another, superior technology country, 
D, presents itself. Assume further that human capital neither depreciates nor appreciates across 
countries, and that the human capital of individual migrant workers is deciphered in D fully and 
immediately upon the migrants’ arrival. 5 The returns to human capital in D are higher than in the 
home country, H. A worker’s output, and thus his gross earnings, in D are given by 
( ) ( ) Cf ++= 1lnˆ qbq , where hab +>  and 0³C  are constant and exogenous to the model. 6 
                                                 
5 Chau and Stark (1999) present a modeling framework that incorporates information asymmetry: while the home 
country worker knows his human capital, employers in D cannot discern this human capital instantaneously upon the 
migrant’s arrival. See also Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997).   
6 Such an output function implies that the private returns of human capital in D are higher than the combined private 
and social returns of human capital in H. Since the private returns of human capital are likely to be higher than the 
social returns ( ha> ) and since earnings in advanced countries are several times those in less developed countries, the 
assumption hab +>  is quite reasonable. The constant C captures earnings-enhancing factors in D other than a 
worker’s own human capital, possibly human capital externalities and/or welfare benefits, and is of no material 
consequence. Furthermore, provided that ab > , our main results carry through with some alternative specifications of 
the earnings function in D. 
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 Workers in H face a probability, 0>p , of obtaining the gross earnings ( )qfˆ  from an 
employment in D. With probability p-1  they do not secure such an employment, in which case 
they work in H for the gross earnings ( )qf . The (risk neutral) worker’s expected gross wage is thus 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1ln1ln11ln +++-+++= qhqaqbq pCpF   (12) 
for 0>q , hab +> , 0>p , and 0³C . The function of the worker’s expected net earnings 
becomes 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] qqhqaqbq kpCpW -+++-+++= 1ln1ln11ln~ .  (13) 
Again, the worker’s decision problem is how much human capital to form. Since 
 
( ) ( )
( )
,
1
1
1
1
~
k
p
k
ppW
-
+
+-
=
-
+
-
+
+
=
¶
¶
q
aab
q
a
q
b
q
q
 
the worker’s chosen level of human capital 7 is 
 
( )
1
~* -
+-
=
k
p aab
q .  (14) 
Therefore, the level of social welfare, measured by net earnings per worker of the workers who 
remain in H, is  
 [ ] kp
k
p
W ++--
+-
+= aab
aab
haq )(
)(
ln)()
~
( * . 
Several results follow. 
 
 In the presence of the possibility of migration, workers choose to form more human capital 
than in the absence of the possibility of migration. To see this we compare *
~
q  in (14) with *q  in 
(3). Since 0>p  and ab > , **
~
qq > . The inducement effect of migration raises the level of human 
capital of all workers including the workers who stay in H. Thus, the inadequacy of human capital 
formation due to the externalities is mitigated and consequently welfare can potentially be 
improved by the possibility of migration. 8 
 
                                                 
7 From the concavity of the ( )qf  and ( )qfˆ  functions it follows that the second-order condition for a maximum, 
( ) ( )
( )
0212
~2
<
+
+-
-=
¶
¶
q
aab
q
q pW
, holds. 
8 If the inducement is strong enough, for example, if b-a is large, the home country could even be left with more total 
human capital in the wake of migration. The “brain gain” could then exceed the “brain drain” for the home country’s 
total human capital. 
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 Since the private returns alone to human capital in D are higher than the total returns to 
human capital in the home country ( hab +> ), the net earnings of the workers who migrate to D 
are higher than the net returns of those who stay behind. Therefore, the possibility of migration 
would make every home country worker better off if it makes the non-migrants better off. To 
examine whether the possibility of migration made the non-migrants better off we therefore 
compare )
~
( *qW  and )( *qW . Viewing the probability of migration, p, as a policy variable, for 
given parameter values of a , b , h  and k, the difference between )
~
( *qW  and )( *qW  is a 
function, denoted as G(×), of p, 
 )(
)(
ln)()()
~
()( ** ab
a
aab
haqq --
+-
+=-= p
p
WWpG .  (15) 
The gains or losses from migration to a worker who remains in the home country are investigated in 
the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: The function G(×) has a unique maximum at 1* <
-
=
ab
h
p , and 0)( * >pG . 
 
Proof: It is easy to verify that G(p) is concave and hence it has a unique maximum. Since  
 )()(
)(
)(
abab
aab
ha
---
+-
+
=
¶
¶
pp
pG
,  
the unique maximum is reached at 
ab
h
-
=*p . Since, by assumption, hab +> , we also know 
that *p  is less than one and hence is a feasible probability.  
 Inserting *p  into (15), we obtain 
 [ ])1(lnln)()( * --=-++= xxxpG ah
a
ha
ha  , 
where .1>
+
=
a
ha
x  Therefore, from the Lemma, 0)( * >pG .  
  
 Proposition 1 reveals that a carefully designed migration policy can be welfare enhancing 
and that the welfare gain of the non-migrants is maximized when the probability of migration is 
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equal to the feasible level *p . 9 When 
ab
h
-
== *pp , the human capital formed under the 
possibility of migration is, according to (14), 
 *** 1
~
q
ha
q =-
+
=
k
. 
Therefore, when the probability of migration is *p , the level of human capital that workers choose 
to form is exactly the level chosen by the social planner in the absence of migration. Thus, the 
welfare of the workers who stay behind, as measured in (5), is inadvertently maximized by the 
inducement effect of the possibility of migration. It is in this sense that a migration policy can 
correct for the human capital externality and restore the social optimum. 10 
 
 A skeptic could argue that the optimal probability *p  is a mere theoretical concept; in 
practice it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the government of the home country to know the 
exact level of *p . This may call into question the usefulness of migration as a tool to improve 
welfare and to correct for the disregard of the human capital externalities. This concern is addressed 
by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: 0)( >pG  for any *0 pp £< . 
 
Proof: For any 
ab
h
-
=£< *0 pp , we have 0)( >-³ abh p .  From (15), 
 [ ] [ ])1(ln)()(ln)()( --=--+--+³ xxxppppG aab
a
aab
aba , 
where 1
)(
>
+-
=
a
aabp
x . Thus, from the Lemma, 0)( >pG .     
 
                                                 
9 This result is more general than our specific functional forms suggest. As long as the welfare function is single-
peaked, q is positively related to p, and q** is attainable for some (interior) p, the result will hold. In other words, 
when the possibility of migration induces sufficiently strong incentives to form human capital, there exists a level of 
the probability of migration such that the single peak of the welfare function is reached. However, if welfare were to 
be measured by the ex ante expected net earnings in (13), the peak of the welfare function cannot be reached at an 
interior probability of migration. We find this case, which calls for setting the probability of migration equal to one, 
both uninteresting and impractical.  
10 If the problem of the social planner in the presence of the possibility of migration is perceived as maximizing the ex 
ante expected net earnings in (13), then the socially optimal level of human capital will be higher than its equivalent 
in the absence of the possibility of migration (q**).  In such a case, the inducement effect of migration cannot bring 
the formation of human capital to its socially optimal level. However, it seems more appropriate to define the social 
optimum ex post, that is, from the perspective of the non-migrants. 
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 Proposition 2 states that, as long as the probability of migration is not greater than p*, the 
net earnings of a worker who stays in H under migration are higher than the net earnings per worker 
without migration. This suggests the practical use of migration as a welfare-enhancing policy tool 
even when the government of H does not know the exact level of the optimal probability. Viewed in 
this light, a tightly controlled migration policy is not necessarily a bad policy. It is not unusual for 
governments of developing countries to impose restrictions on migration. In China, for example, 
not all those who can safely expect to have higher earnings abroad (for instance, because foreign 
organizations are perfectly willing to employ them) can leave. Because the government does not 
grant emigration visas or passports liberally, the Chinese authorities have been criticized for 
restricting migration. Yet, the restrictive migration policy may rest on a sound economic rationale. 
A government of a developing country that controls p,11 without knowing *p , can adopt a cautious 
migration policy as an effective tool to nudge the human capital level toward its social optimum.  
 
 Since 
ab
h
-
=*p , the optimal probability decreases as the gap between the marginal 
productivities of a D country worker and an H country worker widens. Our analysis implies that 
poorer countries need to impose stricter migration restrictions to improve welfare. As a country 
develops, migration restrictions can be relaxed and still be welfare enhancing.  
  
 Notice that )(ln)()(lim
1
ab
a
b
ha --+=
®
pG
p
. Since 0)(lim
1
<
®
pG
p
 for a large enough b, 
we obtain the following proposition, which further supports the use of a restrictive migration policy. 
 
Proposition 3: When b is large enough, too liberal a policy of migration can reduce the welfare of 
the workers who stay in the home country.  
 
Proof: 0)(lim
1
<
®
pG
p
 for a large enough b. Since 0)( * >pG  and 0)(' <pG  for 1* << pp , there 
exists p  such that 0)( <pG  for all pp > . (Furthermore, such p  is lower the higher the difference 
between b and a.)       
  
 To sum up, our analysis suggests that a controlled and restrictive migration policy can be 
welfare enhancing for non-migrants. In particular, in the presence of a controlled migration policy 
                                                 
11 We assume that although the government of H cannot force individuals to form more human capital than they freely 
choose to form, it can exercise control over their exits to the foreign country. 
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with the probability of migration set at p*, the level of human capital that the workers are induced 
to form turns out to be the socially optimal level of human capital had the workers not migrated. 
Technically, our analysis suggests that there is a cutoff probability, p , below which migration 
benefits the non-migrants and above which migration hurts the non-migrants.  
 
 Illustrative numerical examples may be useful. Suppose that the social returns of human 
capital in H are 20 percent of the private returns, that is, ah 2.0= , and that human capital is 10 
times more productive in D than in H, that is, aab 10=- . Then p*=0.02 and 0425.0=p . 12  
When ah 2.0= , the level of b that makes 0)(lim
1
<
®
pG
p
 is only 1.4 times of the size of a. This is 
far from being unusually high.  
 
5. Heterogeneous Workforce, Human Capital Formation, and Migration 
 
The intersection of migration with the presence of externalities gives rise to a concern that those 
who leave adversely affect the productivity of those who stay behind. If the human capital of the 
workers who migrate is higher than the human capital of the workers who stay behind, and if a 
worker’s output is rising in the average level of human capital, the non-migrants will end up worse 
off; the workers who migrate impose a negative externality on the workers who remain. To address 
this concern, we examine what might be expected to constitute the worst possible case from the 
perspective of the low skill workers – the case in which these workers cannot participate in 
migration at all. We show that even in such a harsh environment, the human capital formation 
response of the high skill workers to the migration prospect can lead to the low skill workers being 
better off despite the migration of some of the high skill workers. 
 
Let us now relax the assumption that the workforce is homogeneous. Suppose that there are 
two types of workers in H: Low-ability, type-1 workers and high-ability, type-2 workers. Human 
capital formation is costlier for type-1 workers. Let the cost of forming human capital by a type-1 
worker be ( ) qq 1kC = , where 01 >k  for q q£  and + ¥  otherwise. Let the cost of forming human 
capital by a type-2 worker be ( ) qq 2kC = , where 120 kk << . Let the probability of being selected 
                                                 
12 With the parameter values specified in this example, it follows from (15) that a]10)110ln(2.1[)( pppG -+= . It is 
easy to verify that )( pG is strictly concave with a unique maximum at p* = 0.02 and that, for 10 << p , 0)( =pG  
has a unique solution at 0425.0=p . Thus, in this example, 0)( >pG  for 0425.00 << p  and 0)( <pG for 
10425.0 << p . 
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into employment in D for an H country worker whose human capital is q  be p if q q> , and 0 
otherwise. Workers in H face the same net earnings function as in (2). We consider the case where 
a  is sufficiently large, such that in the absence of migration the optimal level of human capital 
formed by type-1 workers is qq =*1 , and the optimal level of human capital formed by type-2 
workers is q
a
q >-= 1
2
*
2 k
. Figure 1 portrays this configuration of outcomes. Thus, in the absence 
of migration, the average level of human capital in H is 
21
*
221
NN
NN
+
+
=
qq
q , where 1N  and 2N  are 
the numbers of type-1 and type-2 workers, respectively. 
 
The presence of an opportunity to migrate and earn higher wages of C++ )1ln(qb  induces 
the type-2 workers to form more human capital. However, the type-1 workers are immune to this 
inducement effect because of their inability to form more human capital than the minimal level 
required for the probable employment in D. Therefore, under the possibility of migration, the levels 
of human capital formed by type-1 and type-2 workers are, respectively, qq =*1
~
, and 
1
)(~
2
*
2 -
+-
=
k
p aab
q , from (14), and hence, the average level of human capital of the workers 
who remain in H is 
21
*
221
)1(
~
)1(
NpN
NpN
m -+
-+
=
qq
q . 
 
     marginal wage; 
                 marginal cost 
 
 a                    
 
                     
 1k      
 2k           )1( +q
a  
    
                             0      q               1
2
-
k
a
             q  
 
Figure 1 
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A comparison between mq  and q  reveals that a sufficient condition for qq >m  to hold is 
*
2
*
2
~
)1( qq >- p , which in turn is true if 1)1
~
)(1( *2
*
2 +>+- qqp . Since 
 
[ ]
a
aab
a
aab
q
q ---
+=
-+--
=
+
+- ))(1(
1
)1())(1(
1
)1
~
)(1(
*
2
*
2 pppppp , 
1)1
~
)(1( *2
*
2 +>+- qqp  holds if 0>p  and 0))(1( >--- aabp , or, if ab
ab
-
-
<<
2
0 p . 
Therefore, assuming ab 2> , the average level of human capital of the non-migrants in the wake of 
migration is higher than that in the absence of migration as long as 
ab
ab
-
-
<<
2
0 p . In terms of our 
numerical example aab 10=- , this implies that migration raises the average level of human 
capital in H as long as the probability of migration by type-2 workers is less than 90 percent, which 
is hardly a restriction. Thus, the possibility of migration is most likely to bring about a “brain gain,” 
on average.  
 
When the migration prospect leads to a higher average human capital, type-1 workers are 
obviously better off, benefiting from a greater human capital externality. Whether the remaining 
type-2 workers are also better off under migration is less clear. The change of welfare of a type-2 
worker who remains in H is 
 )(
1
1
ln
)(
ln)()
~
()( *2
*
22 abq
q
h
a
aab
aqq --
+
+
+
+-
=-= p
p
WWpG m .  (16) 
Since  
[ ]
[ ] 21
*
22
2
2
2
21
2
*
221
)1(
~)()1(
)1(
~
)1(
NpN
Nk
Np
NpN
NNpN
p
m
-+
---
+
-+
-+
=
¶
¶ q
ab
qqq
, we have  
 0
)2(
)(
)(
0 21
2
2
2
2
21
2
*
221 >
+
+-
+
+
+
==¶
¶
NN
Nk
N
NN
NNN
pp
m
ab
qqq
,  
where the inequality follows from the assumption that ab 2> . Drawing on this inequality, we next 
differentiate (16) with respect to p and evaluate the result at 0=p  to obtain that 
0
0
)(2 >=¶
¶
pp
pG
. By continuity, 0)(2 >pG  holds for p in a small neighborhood of zero. This 
suggests that the type-2 workers who remain in H are indeed also better off when the probability of 
migration is small enough. 
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The discussion in this section reaffirms the main result of the previous section: a restrictive 
migration policy can stimulate human capital formation and improve the welfare of all workers. In 
addition, the possibility of a “brain drain” of high-ability workers from H can confer a positive 
externality on low-ability workers in H. While the potential prevalence of a positive externality 
from migrants to non-migrants has already been recognized (Stark, 1995), the source of the 
externality identified here is new. 
 
Two qualifications are in order. Suppose that instead of linking the productivity of workers 
of different types by the average level of human capital we were to link their productivity by direct 
complementarity. In such a case, the migration of high-ability, type-2 workers might lower the 
productivity of low-ability, type-1 workers by virtue of having fewer high-ability workers in H. The 
possibility that migration by high-ability workers may impinge adversely on the welfare of low-
ability workers because of a progressive tax structure needs be mentioned as well. An adverse 
repercussion could arise if high-ability workers are taxed at relatively high rates to finance public 
goods and transfer payments that benefit low-ability workers. In a model that incorporates these 
considerations, the welfare calculus resulting from the possibility of migration by high-ability 
workers will be more intricate than the one conducted in the present paper. 
  
6. Conclusions 
 
When the productivity of an individual in a closed economy or in a small open economy without 
migration is fostered not only by his own human capital but also by the average level of human 
capital, the individual who optimally chooses how much to invest in costly human capital formation 
will, from a social point of view, under-invest. Consequently, social welfare is affected adversely.  
Not surprisingly, a combination of subsidies and taxes can correct the inefficiencies that arise from 
the human capital externalities. Somewhat surprisingly, migration too can mitigate the undesirable 
outcome. In fact, a well-specified migration policy can ameliorate the tendency to under-invest in 
human capital and instead permit formation of a socially desirable level of human capital. The 
favorable effect of migration and the associated welfare gain apply not only when all individuals 
can respond to the migration prospect but also when only a subset of individuals are affected. In the 
latter case, even those who cannot gain from migration by participating in it stand to gain from the 
response of others to the migration prospect. 
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The propensity to acquire skills is not invariant to the possibility of having the skills 
rewarded highly. This consideration appears to have escaped attention by migration scholars for 
many years. The pioneering work of Grubel and Scott (1966) provides a careful account of why a 
country need not “lose by the emigration of highly skilled individuals.” In Grubel’s and Scott’s 
words “[E]migration should be welcomed whenever two conditions are met. These are, first, that 
the emigrant improves his own income and, second, that the migrant’s departure does not reduce 
the income of those remaining behind” (p. 270). That the prospect of migration modifies the human 
capital formation calculus, thereby entailing a welfare gain for the non-migrants (rather than being 
inconsistent with a welfare loss) has neither been mentioned by Grubel and Scott, nor by those who 
followed in their steps. This paper draws attention to this possible relationship. We have shown that 
the behavioral response to the prospect of migration nourishes both a “brain drain” and a “brain 
gain”, and that a skillfully executed migration policy can confine and utilize the response to secure 
a welfare gain for all workers.  
   
 In our model, the social welfare of workers is enhanced as long as the probability of 
migration is kept below a critical level. The magnitude of this critical level of the migration 
probability, which is the optimal probability that maximizes the welfare gain from migration, 
decreases with the productivity differential of human capital between the destination country and 
the home country. These results offer a positive policy implication: a poor country should adopt a 
restrictive migration policy and gradually relax the restriction as its economy develops. When the 
workforce is heterogeneous, a carefully designed migration policy can benefit both high-skill and 
low-skill workers, even when the low-skill workers cannot directly exploit the migration prospect. 
Furthermore, the larger the wage differential between the destination country and the home country, 
the greater the incentive to accumulate human capital and the more likely that the “brain drain” of 
migrants will be outweighed by the “brain gain” of non-migrants. It follows then that, contrary to 
the received wisdom, the poor in a poor country stand to gain more and need to fear less from 
properly controlled migration by skilled members of the country’s workforce.  
 
Presenting migration as a device that facilitates the formation of a socially desirable level of 
human capital need not imply that migration is the only – or even the preferred – means of 
achieving this objective. Implementing a program to mandate the acquisition of compulsory skills is 
another way to facilitate the formation of a socially desirable level of human capital, as is an 
offering of generous (probabilistic) prizes to those who achieve this goal. Whereas recourse to these 
schemes entails a cost to the government, however, migration requires none. 
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 We have assumed that the human capital formed in the home country is perfectly 
transferable to the destination country. In the preceding section we have assumed that the 
probability of migration depends on the workers’ level of skill. This latter assumption can duly 
salvage the human capital formation incentives associated with the prospect of migration when the 
human capital formed in the home country is not on a par with the comparable human capital 
formed in the destination country. Specifically, and even when the returns to human capital in the 
home country are low, our key argument is retained upon letting the probability of migration 
depend positively on the attainment of the necessary skills. 
 
Our model stands in sharp contrast to the received literature on the brain drain. In particular, 
we consider the policy implications for a government that can costlessly exercise control over the 
migration of skilled workers: while the prescription of the standard approach does not favor 
migration, ours allows it, though with caution. Implicitly, however, our model shares a concern 
with that literature. We have assigned a well-defined role and a specific policy mandate to the 
government of the home country, which presupposes the existence of effective political institutions. 
Weaknesses and shortcomings in this regard could hinder the feasibility of the action we advocate. 
 
Finally, we note that our key “inducement effect” of migration is quite robust to alternative 
functional and model specifications. In the present paper, the analysis has been based on a simple 
model with simple cost and benefit functions. These have fostered considerable transparency and 
straightforward tractability. In a related paper (Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz, 1998), 
intertemporal utility-maximizing individuals who choose the level of their human capital optimally 
respond to the possibility of migration in a manner akin to that of workers in the simple 
specification employed in the present paper. 
 16 
Appendix I 
 
Proof of Lemma: We seek to show that for any 1>x , 1ln -> xxx . Since  
 01limlnlim
11
=-=
®®
xxx
xx
;  
 
( )
1
1
ln1
)ln(
=
¶
-¶
>+=
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, 
we have  
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Appendix II 
 
Let .x
k
=
+ha
 Then from (10): 
( )
,
1
x
sk
t
=
-
- a
 or 
( ) ( )skxt -=- a1 . (A1) 
Let us rewrite (11) using x and (A1) as 
( )1ln -= xsxtkx   
or 
1
ln
-
=
x
xtkx
s . (A2) 
Inserting this into (A1) gives 
( ) úû
ù
êë
é
-
-=-
1
ln
1
x
xtkx
kxt a  
or 
1
ln2
-
-
-
=
x
xkx
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t
a
a
. 
Let 
xx
x
ln
1-
=d , where 0 < d < 1 as follows from the Lemma. Then, 
d
a
a
kx
kx
t
-
-
= . (A3) 
Since 
( )
d
hdaha
d
a
d
a
--
=
+
×-=-
1
k
kkx
 and h
ha
aa -=
+
-=-
k
kkx , we can rewrite (A3) as 
( ) ( ) had
dh
d
hda
h
+-
=
--
-
=
11
t . (A4) 
Since 0 < d < 1, it is clear from (A4) that 0 < t < 1. Inserting this t in (A2) gives 
( ) ( ) .k  k 11 <-+=×+-= adh
h
dhad
dh k
s  
Now, with ( ) had
dh
+-
=
1
t  and ( )adh
h
-+
=
1
k
s  we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ***** ~1~ln~1~ln~~ qqhaqqhaq stkW +++--++= ( ) ( ) ( )****** 1ln qqqha Wk =-++= . 
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